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CONTINUOUS-TIME ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAME WITH
STOPPING AND CONTROL
CHANDAN PAL AND SUBHAMAY SAHA
Abstract. We consider a zero-sum stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chain
with countable state space and unbounded transition and pay-off rates. The additional
feature of the game is that the controllers together with taking actions are also allowed to
stop the process. Under suitable hypothesis we show that the game has a value and it is the
unique solution of certain dynamic programming inequalities with bilateral constraints. In
the process we also prescribe a saddle point equilibrium.
Keywords: zero-sum game; stopping time; optimal strategy; dynamic programming in-
equalities.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this article we consider a zero-sum stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chain.
The transition and reward rates are assumed to be unbounded. The additional feature is
that players other than taking actions also has the option of stopping the game. We show
that the game has a value and it is the unique solution of a set of dynamic programming
inequalities with bilateral constrains. The existence of optimal strategies for both players
is also establish. These optimal strategies also give optimal stopping rules for both players.
Stochastic control problems for continuous time Markov chains, both for one controller and
multi-controller setup has been studied by a variety of authors, see [8] and references therein.
But to the best of our knowledge there is no work on continuous-time Markov chains with
the dual feature of control as well as stopping. Stochastic games with only stopping was
introduced by Dynkin [3]. Such games also known in literature as Dynkin games has been
investigated for discrete time case, see ([10, 13]), as well as for continuous-time case, see
([2, 11, 14]). Stochastic games with control and stopping has been studied for discrete time
case in [6], and for continuous-time non-degenerate diffusion in ([1, 5]). The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. In section II, we give the detailed problem formulation and
in section III we prove the existence of value of the game and saddle point equilibrium.
2. Game Formulation
The stochastic game model that we are interested in is given by {S,U, V, q, r, ψ1, ψ2}.
The components have the following interpretation. S is countable set and without any loss
1
2 CHANDAN PAL AND SUBHAMAY SAHA
of generality we take S = {0, 1, 2, 3, · · · }. S is the state space of the controlled continuous-
time Markov chain. U and V are metric spaces representing the action sets of player I and
II respectively. The component q = [q(j|i, a, b)] is the controlled transition rate matrix,
satisfying the following properties:
(i) q(j|i, a, b) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S, i 6= j, a ∈ U , b ∈ V .
(ii) It is assumed to be conservative, i.e.,
∑
j∈S
q(j|i, a, b) = 0 for all i ∈ S, a ∈ U, b ∈ V.
(iii) We also assume it is stable, i.e.,
q(i) = sup
a∈U,b∈V
∑
j 6=i
q(j|i, a, b) <∞ for all i ∈ S .
The reward rate is given by r : S × U × V → [0,∞) and ψi : S → [0,∞), i = 1, 2 are
the stopped payoff functions for the players.
At time t = 0, suppose the process starts from state i and player I and player II
independently chooses actions a and b then player II receives a reward at the rate r(i, a, b)
until the next jump epoch which occurs after an exponential (
∑
j 6=i q(j|i, a, b)) amount of
time. The next state of the process is j with probability
q(j|i, a, b)∑
j 6=i q(j|i, a, b)
. The game then
repeats from the new sate j. If at state i, player I decides to stop the game then, player
II receives a payoff of ψ1(i), where as if player II decides to stop then she receives a
payoff equal to ψ2(i). Player II tries to maximize her accumulated expected discounted
reward, which player I wishes to minimize the same. Here we will consider only randomized
stationary control although things go through with randomized Markov control as well.
A randomized stationary control for player I is a measurable function Φ : S → P(U).
similarly Ψ : S → P(V ) is a randomized stationary control for player II. We denote by Π1
and Π2 the set of all randomized stationary controls for player I and player II respectively.
In order to guarantee the existence of a non explosive process (finite jumps in a finite time)
we assume the following:
Assumption (A1):
There exists N non-negative functions wn on S and a positive constant c such that for all
i ∈ S, a ∈ U, b ∈ V ,
∑
j∈S
q(j|i, a, b)wn(j) ≤ wn+1(i), for n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1
and furthermore, ∑
j∈S
q(j|i, a, b)wN (j) ≤ 0
3and
q(i) ≤ c(w1(i) + w2(i) + · · · +wN (i)), for all i ∈ S.
It is well known that under the above assumptions, for randomized stationary controls
(Φ,Ψ) there exists a non explosive continuous time Markov chain, see [7]. We denote the
state process by Xt and let Ut and Vt denote the control processes for player I and II
respectively.
Let {Ft : t ≥ 0} denote the natural filtration of {Xt : t ≥ 0}. Then a strategy for player
I is a pair (Φ,Θ1) where Φ ∈ Π1 and Θ1 is a Ft-stopping time. Similarly for player II
a strategy is a pair (Ψ,Θ2) where Ψ ∈ Π2 and Θ2 is a Ft-stopping time. The evaluation
criterion is given by
Jα(i,Φ,Ψ,Θ
1,Θ2) = EΦ,Ψi
[∫ Θ1∧Θ2
0
e−αtr(Xt, Ut, Vt)dt
+ e−α(Θ
1∧Θ2)
{
ψ1(XΘ1)1{Θ1<Θ2} + ψ2(XΘ2)1{Θ1≥Θ2}
}]
,
where α > 0 is the discount factor and 1{·} is the indicator function. Player II wishes to
maximize Jα(i,Φ,Ψ,Θ
1,Θ2) over her strategies (Ψ,Θ2) and player I wishes to minimize
the same over all pairs (Φ,Θ1). Define
U(i) = inf
(Φ,Θ1)
sup
(Ψ,Θ2)
Jα(i,Φ,Ψ,Θ
1,Θ2)
and
L(i) = sup
(Ψ,Θ2)
inf
(Φ,Θ1)
Jα(i,Φ,Ψ,Θ
1,Θ2).
Then U(i) is called the upper value of the game and L(i) is called the lower value of the
game. The game is said to have a value if U(i) = L(i).
A strategy (Φ∗,Θ1∗) is said to be optimal for player I if
L(i) ≥ Jα(i,Φ
∗,Ψ,Θ1∗,Θ2) for all i ∈ S
and for all strategies (Ψ,Θ2) of player II. Analogously, A strategy (Ψ∗,Θ2∗) is said to be
optimal for player II if
U(i) ≤ Jα(i,Φ,Ψ
∗,Θ1,Θ2∗) for all i ∈ S
and for all strategies (Φ,Θ1) of player I. ((Φ∗,Θ1∗), (Ψ∗,Θ2∗)) is called a saddle point
equilibrium, if it exists.
3. Existence of Value and Saddle Point Equilibrium
In order to characterize the value of the game and to establish the existence of a saddle
point equilibrium we will need the following assumption:
Assumption (A2):
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(i) U and V are compact sets;
(ii) r(i, a, b) and q(j|i, a, b) are continuous in (a, b) ∈ U × V ;
(iii) LetW (i) = w1(i)+w2(i)+· · ·+wN (i), for all i ∈ S. The function
∑
j∈S q(j|i, a, b)W (j)
is continuous in (a, b) ∈ U × V ;
(iv) there is a constant M such that
r(i, a, b) ≤MW (i), for all i ∈ S and (a, b) ∈ U × V,
ψ1(i) ≤MW (i), for all i ∈ S
and
ψ2(i) < ψ1(i), for all i ∈ S;
(v) there exists a non-negative function W˜ on S and positive constants c and c˜ such that
q(i)W (i) ≤MW˜ (i), for all i ∈ S
and ∑
j∈S
q(j|i, a, b)W˜ (j) ≤ cW˜ (i) + c˜ for all i ∈ S and (a, b) ∈ U × V.
Set
BW (S) =
{
f : S → [0,∞)
∣∣ sup
i∈S
f(i)
W (i)
<∞
}
,
where W is as in (A2). Define for f ∈ BW (S),
‖f‖W = sup
i∈S
f(i)
W (i)
.
Then BW (S) is a Banach space with the norm ‖ · ‖W .
For any two states i, j ∈ S, any two probability measures µ ∈ P(U) and ν ∈ P(V ) define
r˜(i, µ, ν) =
∫
V
∫
U
r(i, a, b)µ(da)ν(db)
and
q˜(j|i, µ, ν) =
∫
V
∫
U
q(j|i, a, b)µ(da)ν(db).
For φ ∈ BW (S) define
H+α (i, φ) = inf
µ∈P(U)
sup
ν∈P(V )
[
r˜(i, µ, ν) +
∑
j∈S
q˜(j|i, µ, ν)φ(j)
]
and
H−α (i, φ) = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
[
r˜(i, µ, ν) +
∑
j∈S
q˜(j|i, µ, ν)φ(j)
]
.
Further define
I+α (i, φ) = inf
µ∈P(U)
sup
ν∈P(V )
[ r˜(i, µ, ν)
α+ q(i) + 1
+
q(i) + 1
α+ q(i) + 1
∑
j∈S
p˜(j|i, µ, ν)φ(j)
]
,
5where
p˜(j|i, µ, ν) =
q˜(j|i, µ, ν)
q(i) + 1
+ δij
(δij is the Kronecker delta). Similarly define,
I−α (i, φ) = sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
[ r˜(i, µ, ν)
α+ q(i) + 1
+
q(i) + 1
α+ q(i) + 1
∑
j∈S
p˜(j|i, µ, ν)φ(j)
]
.
Note that by Fan’s minimax theorem [4], H+α = H
−
α := Hα and I
+
α = I
−
α := Iα. Now
consider the following dynamic programming inequalities with bilateral constraints:
ψ2(i) ≤ φ(i) ≤ ψ1(i)
αφ(i) −Hα(i, φ) = 0 if ψ2(i) < φ(i) < ψ1(i)
αφ(i) −Hα(i, φ) ≥ 0 if ψ2(i) = φ(i) (3.1)
αφ(i) −Hα(i, φ) ≤ 0 if ψ1(i) = φ(i)
or equivalently
ψ2(i) ≤ φ(i) ≤ ψ1(i)
φ(i)− Iα(i, φ) = 0 if ψ2(i) < φ(i) < ψ1(i)
φ(i)− Iα(i, φ) ≥ 0 if ψ2(i) = φ(i) (3.2)
φ(i)− Iα(i, φ) ≤ 0 if ψ1(i) = φ(i).
Theorem 3.1. Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the following are equivalent.
(i) φ satisfies (3.2).
(ii) φ(i) = min{max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}.
(iii) φ(i) = max{min{Iα(i, φ);ψ1(i)};ψ2(i)}.
Proof. Here we prove only the equivalence of (i) and (ii), others can be proved similarly.
Suppose (i) is true and i ∈ S is such that ψ2(i) < Φ(i) < ψ1(i). Then
φ(i) = Iα(i, φ)
= max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)}
= min{max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}
If ψ2(i) = φ(i). Then φ(i) ≥ Iα(i, φ). Therefore
φ(i) = max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)}
= min{max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)},
since ψ2(i) ≤ φ(i) ≤ ψ1(i).
If ψ1(i) = φ(i). Then φ(i) ≤ Iα(i, φ) and ψ2(i) ≤ φ(i) ≤ ψ1(i). Hence
Iα(i, φ) = max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)}.
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Therefore
φ(i) = ψ1(i) = min{max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}.
Now assume that (ii) is true, i.e.,
φ(i) = min{max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}.
Suppose i ∈ S is such that ψ2(i) < φ(i) < ψ1(i). Then
φ(i) = max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)}
= Iα(i, φ)
If ψ2(i) = φ(i). Then by assumption (A2), φ(i) < ψ1(i). Therefore
φ(i) = max{Iα(i,Φ);ψ2(i)}
≥ Iα(i, φ).
If ψ1(i) = φ(i). Then by assumption (A2), φ(i) > ψ2(i). Therefore φ(i) = ψ1(i) ≤
max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)}, which implies that φ(i) ≤ Iα(i, φ) (since φ(i) > ψ2(i) ). It is easy to
see that ψ2(i) ≤ φ(i) ≤ ψ1(i). Hence φ satisfies (3.2). 
Now define the operator T : BW (S)→ BW (S) by
Tφ(i) := min{max{Iα(i, φ);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}.
Let u0(i) = ψ2(i) and un = Tun−1, n ≥ 1. Then the following is true.
Proposition 3.1. Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the sequence of functions {un}n≥0
is a non-decreasing and there exists u∗ ∈ BW (S) such that lim
n→∞
un = u
∗. Further u∗ is a
fixed point of T , i.e., Tu∗ = u∗.
Proof. Clearly u1(i) = Tu0(i) ≥ ψ2(i) = u0(i) for all i ∈ S. Now suppose un ≥ un−1. It is
easy to see that Iα(i,Φ) is monotone in Φ. Thus we have
un+1(i) = Tun(i) = min{max{Iα(i, un);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}
≥ min{max{Iα(i, un−1);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}
= Tun−1(i) = un(i).
Thus by induction we have that {un}n≥0 is a non-decreasing. Therefore there exists u
∗ ∈
BW (S) such that u
∗(i) = lim
n→∞
un(i) for all i ∈ S. Now clearly
Tu∗(i) ≥ Tun(i) = un+1(i).
Taking limit n→∞ on both sides we get,
Tu∗(i) ≥ u∗(i) for all i ∈ S.
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un+1(i) = Tun(i)
= min{max{Iα(i, un);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}
= min
{
max
{
sup
ν∈P(V )
inf
µ∈P(U)
[ r˜(i, µ, ν)
α+ q(i) + 1
+
q(i) + 1
α+ q(i) + 1
∑
j∈S
p˜(j|i, µ, ν)un(j)
]
;ψ2(i)
}
;ψ1(i)
}
≥ min
{
max
{[ r˜(i, µ∗n, ν)
α+ q(i) + 1
+
q(i) + 1
α+ q(i) + 1
∑
j∈S
p˜(j|i, µ∗n, ν)un(j)
]
;ψ2(i)
}
;ψ1(i)
}
,
where ν ∈ P(V ) is arbitrary. The existence of µ∗n ∈ P(U) is ensured by assumption (A2).
Now since P(U) is compact. There exists µ∗ ∈ P(U) such that µn → µ
∗ in P(U). Thus by
extended Fatou’s [Lemma 8.3.7(b) in [9]] we have by letting n→∞ on both sides,
u∗(i) ≥ min
{
max
{[ r˜(i, µ∗, ν)
α+ q(i) + 1
+
q(i) + 1
α+ q(i) + 1
∑
j∈S
p˜(j|i, µ∗, ν)u∗(j)
]
;ψ2(i)
}
;ψ1(i)
}
≥ min
{
max
{
inf
µ∈P(U)
[ r˜(i, µ, ν)
α+ q(i) + 1
+
q(i) + 1
α+ q(i) + 1
∑
j∈S
p˜(j|i, µ, ν)u∗(j)
]
;ψ2(i)
}
;ψ1(i)
}
.
Since the above is true for any ν ∈ P(V ). Hence we have
u∗(i) ≥ min{max{Iα(i, u
∗);ψ2(i)};ψ1(i)}
= Tu∗(i).
Thus we are done. 
Let Φ∗ ∈ Π1 and Ψ∗ ∈ Π2 be such that
Hα(i, u
∗) = sup
ν∈P(V )
[
r˜(i,Φ∗(i), ν) +
∑
j∈S
q˜(j|i,Φ∗(i), ν)u∗(j)
]
and
Hα(i, u
∗) = inf
µ∈P(U)
[
r˜(i, µ,Ψ∗(i)) +
∑
j∈S
q˜(j|i, µ,Ψ∗(i))u∗(j)
]
.
The existence of Φ∗ ∈ Π1 and Ψ∗ ∈ Π2 follows from assumption (A2) and measurable
selection theorem [12].
Define
A1 = {i ∈ S|u
∗(i) = ψ1(i)}
and
A2 = {i ∈ S|u
∗(i) = ψ2(i)}.
Let {Xt; t ≥ 0} be the state process governed by the stationary controls Φ
∗ ∈ Π1 and
Ψ∗ ∈ Π2. Let
Θ1∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|Xt ∈ A1}
and
Θ2∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|Xt ∈ A2}.
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Then we have our main theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the stochastic game with stopping and
control has a value and u∗(i) = U(i) = L(i). Thus U∗ is the unique fixed point of T . Further
((Φ∗,Θ1∗), (Ψ∗,Θ2∗)) is a saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. Let i ∈ S be such that u∗(i) < ψ1(i). Let Ψ be any stationary control of player
II. Let {X˜t; t ≥ 0} be the process governed by the stationary controls Φ
∗ and Ψ and let
Θ˜1 = inf{t ≥ 0|X˜t ∈ A1}, Θ
2 be any stopping time of player II. Then by Dynkin’s formula
we get for T ≥ 0,
E
Φ∗,Ψ
i
[
e−α(T∧Θ˜
1∧Θ2)u∗(X˜T∧Θ˜1∧Θ2)
]
− u∗(i)
= EΦ
∗,Ψ
i
∫ T∧Θ˜1∧Θ2
0
e−αt
[
− αu∗(X˜t) +
∑
j∈S
q˜(j|X˜t,Φ
∗(X˜t),Ψ(X˜t))u
∗(j)
]
dt
≤ −EΦ
∗,Ψ
i
∫ T∧Θ˜1∧Θ2
0
e−αtr(X˜t, Ut, Vt)dt.
Now letting T →∞ we get,
u∗(i) ≥ EΦ
∗,Ψ
i
∫ Θ˜1∧Θ2
0
e−αtr(X˜t, Ut, Vt)dt
+ EΦ
∗,Ψ
i
[
e−α(Θ˜
1∧Θ2)u∗(X˜Θ˜1∧Θ2)
]
≥ Jα(i,Φ
∗,Ψ, Θ˜1,Θ2).
Since the above is true for any strategy (Ψ,Θ2) of player II, we obtain u∗(i) ≥ U(i).
Analogously it can be shown that u∗(i) ≤ L(i). Hence we are done. 
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